Adult Child 1975 Act Claims: What is “Something More”?

The recent judgment in Isaacs v Green provides a helpful example of an adult child successfully claiming under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”).

The claimant, David Isaacs, aged 74, initially received nothing under his late mother's Will. However, after pursuing his claim and presenting his evidence at trial, the court awarded him £150,000, which represented 25% of her residuary estate.

Historically, claims by adult children under the 1975 Act were often difficult to successfully pursue before the courts: judges were too keen to avoid eroding testamentary freedom. The initial leading authority of Re Coventry [1980] made this point clear:

“It cannot be enough to say ‘here is a son of the deceased; he is in necessitous circumstances; there is property of the deceased which could be made available to assist him but which is not available if the deceased’s dispositions stand; therefore those dispositions do not make reasonable provision for the applicant."

"There must, as it seems to me, be established some sort of moral claim by the applicant to be maintained by the deceased or at the expense of his estate beyond the mere fact of a blood relationship, some reason why it can be said that, in the circumstances, it is unreasonable that no or no greater provision was in fact made.”

What is a 'moral claim'?

Since 1980, the meaning of “moral claim” has been debated by the judiciary, practitioners and academics alike. Given that morality, is an inherently subjective concept, it is perhaps unsurprising that a definitive conclusion was not reached.

Lord Hughes, providing the Supreme Court’s leading judgment in Illot v The Blue Cross [2017] sought to provide some much needed clarity, by rejecting the suggestion a moral claim had to be established. Rather, there had to be “something more” other than a parent-child relationship and financial need, to justify interfering with the testator’s wishes.

Given the relative scarcity of contested 1975 Act trials, this can, in turn, make it difficult to form clear and definitive conclusions, as to when a court will accept “something more” has been shown, since the decision in Ilott.

For context, it should be remembered that there were five appeals in Ilott, which took nearly 10 years to be heard, only for the Supreme Court to decide that the initial judge’s award of £50,000 to the adult child, should not be disturbed.

While each case will of course turn on its own facts, a non-exhaustive list of recent judgments in adult child 1975 Act claims are explored to see if any trends or conclusions can be established when seeking to define “something more”.

Examples of “something more” in successful adult child claims

Issacs v Green [2025] EWHC 1951 (Fam)

The claimant’s exclusion from his mother’s will, was found to be due to his mother’s concerns about the financial repercussions of the divorce he was going through at the time she gave instructions for her will. This had not necessarily reflected a poor relationship and therefore this was the “something more” factor which persuaded the judge to provide him 25% of the estate.

It should also be added that the judge found the claimant lived modestly, in his mother’s house (along with one of his sisters, who was a 50% beneficiary and did not oppose his claim). He also spent £450 a month on commemorative coins and stamps, which were factored into his maintenance needs, otherwise living a frugal lifestyle.

Howe v Howe [2025] unreported (at present)

While the claimant had been estranged from the deceased, a pirate radio engineer, who had amassed a £1.4m estate on his death, the judge rejected the submission that the claim should fail for want of a moral claim or something more.

The claimant’s barrister at trial, submitted that the claimant’s financial provision was directly related to her father’s neglect of her during her adolescence, which is when she started taking drugs. The defendants raised numerous conduct issues in defence, which the judge found to be minor factors. The claimant’s health issues, which made her unable to work and seemingly caused by the deceased, were powerful factors, presumably reflecting the “something more” element, which allowed the judge to make financial provision for her, in the sum of £125,000.

This case could perhaps be seen as a slight outlier, given some of the more controversial parts of the financial award, namely funds to cover part of the costs the claimant had incurred in unsuccessful pursuing an earlier will challenge, as well as to cover the cost of her breast implants. Further, as the judgment has not been published (yet), it is difficult to draw any significant conclusions.

Fennessy v Turner [2022] WTLR 1295

In this matter, the High Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to award the claimant, an adult child who was 60 at the time of the claim, £195,000 out of his mother’s estate worth c.£360,000. The judge found that his mother had made previous assurances to him that he would inherit everything which had not been withdrawn.

These assurances were sufficient to give rise to a moral obligation, which was a material factor. Coupled with the claimant’s disability, low income, need for accommodation and limited future earning capability, it justified the award made.

Rochford v Rochford [2021] unreported

As the judgment has not been published, but drawing on the commentary available from those involved the case, the claimant was due £25,000 under her father’s will. His estate was valued at £193,000. Despite the claimant owning her own property as well as having a difficult relationship with the deceased, the judge found that her income shortfall and disability justified an additional award of £85,000.  The judge also found that the claimant had made every reasonable effort to keep in touch with the deceased, which was capable of satisfying the “something more” test.

One of the other powerful factors in favour of the claimant arose as a consequence of the judge taking a dim view of defendant’s aggressive stance, where they refused to mediate for over a year. Coupled with the defendant’s failure to beat the claimant’s Part 36 offer, they were ordered to pay the claimant’s costs on the indemnity basis.

Higgins v Morgan [2021] EWHC 2846 (Ch)

The claimant, the deceased’s stepson, under the intestacy rules, did not benefit from his stepfather’s estate, valued at c.£195,000 at trial. The judge found that the claimant had a close relationship with his stepfather, who had provided his stepson with assurances that he would make a will in his favour. As the judge made these findings of fact, the “some form of moral claim” had been satisfied. The claimant received a sum of £40,800, which was increased by £14,200 to cover part of the legal costs (i.e. the success fee) he owed to his solicitors under his “no win, no fee” agreement.

However, the Supreme Court in Hirachand v Hirachand [2024] UKSC 43 has recently ruled that financial provision, to cover a success fee, cannot be made as part of an award under the 1975 Act.

Nahajec v Fowle [2017] EW Misc 11 CC

Shortly after the Supreme Court handed down their judgment in Illot, the County Court in Leeds had to determine a claim made by an adult daughter (31) of the deceased, who had been left nothing under her father’s will. He left his c.£265,000 estate to his friend.

The judge found that the claimant was living a frugal existence, out of necessity and proportionately, reasonable. She wanted to train to become a veterinary nurse, which required some capital to pay the associated course fees. Further, the judge found that the estrangement stemmed from her father being stubborn and intransigent, all of which provided the court with the ability to find that “something more” had been satisfied. The judge awarded her £30,000 out of the estate.

Unsuccessful adult child claims and “something more”

While only a brief summary, here are a summary of reported judgments post Illot on unsuccessful adult child claims.

Batstone v Batstone [2022] WTLR 835

In this claim, the claimant failed to persuade the trial judge that reasonable financial provision had not been made. She sought c.£136,000, out of an estate which had liquidity of c.£101,000, with the remaining estate value of £225,000 tied up in the property the deceased owned with the defendant.

There had been a lengthy period of estrangement of c15 years, during which the claimant had not been financially dependent on the deceased and lived independently. The claimant was found to earn more than the national average, which comfortably exceeded her outgoings, which in any event, were deemed to be excessive. Ultimately, the estrangement or the deceased’s conduct towards the claimant, did not give rise to any moral claim or “something more”.

Given that the claimant could not point to a financial need for a significant period of time, coupled with excessive outgoings, it is perhaps not hard to see why the judge found it hard to find “something more”.  

Miles v Shearer [2021] EWHC 1000 (Ch)

Following the trend in Batstone, here, two adult child daughters of the deceased brought claims against their late father’s, which was valued at c.£2.2m net. They were his two children from his first marriage. The judge noted evidence that the deceased had known his daughters to call him “the cheque book”. Prior to his divorce, and up to their early adulthood, the claimants had a high standard of living. The judge found that they were not entirely satisfactory witnesses.

The claimants unsuccessfully submitted that their father had a moral obligation to provide for them, given the previous lifestyle they had enjoyed, twenty years earlier, before his divorce. The claimants had each received significant financial lifetime assistance from their father, which allowed them to purchase properties. They both had good, well paid jobs with future earning capacity. Ultimately, they were unable to demonstrate a need for maintenance which they could not meet, if necessary, by adjustment to their lifestyle.

Wellesey v Wellesey & others [2019] EWHC 11 (Ch)

The trial judge dismissed the claimant, the eldest daughter of the 7^th Earl of Cowley’s, claim for reasonable financial provision from his estate. Under his will, she was to receive £20,000 out of his estate valued at c.£1.32m. She sought c.£520,000 for her needs, as well as those of her disabled son. However, the judge found that she had not been responsible for his financial maintenance as well as the fundamental issue that he would need to bring a separate claim.  

More broadly, the judge found that she was able to live within her means, even though her income was limited to receipt of benefits.

The factor of magnetic importance was that the judge found that the c.30 year estrangement had been due to the claimant’s conduct alone. She lived a bohemian lifestyle which her father strongly disapproved of and that was sufficient to outweigh all of the other factors, including her submissions of “something more”.

What can the case law teach us?

Accordingly, what conclusions, if any, can be drawn from a summary assessment of some of the recent adult child claims post Illot that have reached trial?

While perhaps an oversimplification, in nearly all of the successful claims, the claimant could point to a significant financial need and conversely, in nearly all of the unsuccessful claims, the claimant could not. While each of the s.3 criteria the court has to consider under a 1975 Act claim are equally weighted, it may be that a judge is more receptive to submissions made about “something more” when a financial need can be shown.

Examples of “something more” have been a promise made by the testator to the claimant or no fault by the claimant in any estrangement. Of course, the purpose of the 1975 Act is not designed to reward “good” behaviour or punish “bad” behaviour so for claimants, defendants and practitioners alike, it is important to consider the strength and weight a court may place on evidence supporting “something more” at the outset of a matter.

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